DEMONSTRATION OF SEPTEMBER 26
WHILE the 90th Division did not enter the Meuse-Argonne front until October 22, it played a part in the
offensive on September 26 the first day of the big attack – which will long be remembered. The 1st
Army decided that simultaneously with the attack west of the Meuse, demonstrations would be made by
the divisions between the Meuse and the Moselle. In addition, all divisions east of the Meuse under the
1st Army command were to be held in readiness to attack or take up the pursuit in case the enemy
showed signs of weakness or withdrawal.
On the night of September 24 the order of the 4th Corps was received directing the 69th (French)
Division, east of the Moselle, and the 90th, 78th, 89th, and 42d Divisions, west of the Moselle, to make
raids simultaneously, starting on D day at H hour, and penetrating through the enemy’s zone of outposts
to the hostile line of resistance. In a conference with the brigade commanders that same night at Villers-
en-Haye. General Allen decided upon the plan for the 90th Division raid.
It was decided that the raiding party should be made up of troops from each brigade. The 179th
Brigade’s quota was about 500 men. For this operation Companies B and D of the 358th Infantry were
raised to full war strength of 250 by attaching men from other units to fill up the depleted ranks. The
raiding party of the 180thBrigade consisted of Companies F and H, 359th Infantry, under the command
of Captain Fred N. Oliver, Company E, and Companies E and F, 360th Infantry, commanded by Major
Charles E. Kerr. Lieutenant-Colonel R. T. Phinney, 359th Infantry, was in command of the entire 180th
Brigade detachment.
That the Germans had anticipated with uncanny shrewdness the nature of our operations was
proved in the preparations they made to forestall the attack, and was later further verified by the
statements of German officers of the 123d Infantry Division, which held the line at this point. The
German outposts had been doubled by bringing up an additional battalion, and a half hour before
midnight of September 25-26, while the raiding parties were moving to their assembly positions, a
terrific barrage came down upon our lines. The companies of the 360th Infantry suffered especially, and
were unable to reach their position until 4 A. M. The enemy also started out early in the night to test out
our positions with patrols, which undoubtedly carried back information as to our dispositions and
intentions. For the purpose of the raid, the companies of the 359th had taken up a position in front of the
358th sector, about 100 meters beyond the edge of the Bois des Rappes. They reached their places about
9:30 P. M. and were almost immediately attacked by a large German patrol. Later in the night their
position was again strongly assailed. The 179th Brigade detachment encountered German patrols in the
Bois des Rappes, and were forced to drive them out in order to reach their jumping-off place near the
point where the road from Huit Chemins to Grange-en-Haie Farm debouches from the woods. They
were in place about a half hour before midnight, Captain George B. Danenhour, commanding the two
companies, making his P. C. in the hospital at the edge of the woods.
Just at the zero hour, 5:30 A. M., another violent barrage fell between the attacking and support
companies of the 180th Brigade. And no sooner had the assaulting waves debouched when they were
swept by a withering machine gun fire.
The plan for the raid contemplated that the raiders would strike due north until the road from
Sebastopol Farm to Pagny was reached, the men from the 179th Brigade then turning west and returning
by the light railway, while the detachment from the Texas Brigade was to turn east along the valley
south of Bois de Beaume Haie and circle Preny. In keeping with this scheme of march, the artillery
barrage was also to execute a “column right” or “column left.” For six hours prior to the attack, army
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