XIIChptr13

Chapter 13

SECOND MOSELLE. 14 MARCH 45-22 MARCH 45

1. The Real "Operation Grab"

The krauts had called the Ardennes offensive "Operation Grab" (Greif), but their operation had

ended by "grabbing"-nothing. "Operation Grab" could far better be applied to XII Corps' next move.

That ended by grabbing off the better part of two German armies. …

To understand how this worked, it will be necessary to take a look at the Big Picture. Just

northwest of the point where XII Corps columns at first struck the banks of the Rhine lay the little town

of Remagen. There, as the whole world knows, on 7 March 45, the 9th Armored and 9th Infantry

Divisions, with other troops of First Army's III Corps, had had the audacity and incredible good fortune

to capture still standing a bridge across the great river. This span, the Ludendorf Railway Bridge, had

been seized, with superb courage and presence of mind, by the first American troops to reach it. The US

Army had immediately thrown its heart, and everything else it had to risk, across into the lucky

bridgehead. For 10 days of irreplaceable activity that damaged span held. Then without warning it fell

into the river with two hundred odd Americans who happened to be on it at the instant. But by then

American engineers had backed up the crossing with floating bridges and the great steel structure was no

longer indispensable.

As XII Corps stood poised in the angle of the Rhine and Moselle, troops had been pouring across

the Ludendorf Bridge for a week. It must've seemed to the German High Command that XII Corps'

armor and infantry would inevitably be sucked into that sluiceway – so near at hand, so nearly in a direct

continuation of the arrow-flight of the corps all the way from Luxembourg. But if this was their exact

line of reasoning, they counted without two important factors: (1) it was apparent that the armies to the

North had the Remagen situation well in hand and (2) in another direction lay even more gleaming

prizes for XII Corps to take for the grabbing.

Just southeast of the Moselle lay two German provinces, the Palatinate and the Saarland.

Against the fortifications and the estimated 80,000 soldiers of the German First and Seventh Armies,

protecting these rich territories along their southern boundary, the Seventh U.S. Army had been

battering for small advantage since December 1944. Between Seventh Army and XII Corps, XX Corps

of the Third Army had been stalled to the south of the hinge city of Trier since before the beginning of

the Battle of the Bulge. What the situation obviously called for was some decisive force applied in an

unexpected direction to bring the whole regrettable impasse to a solution. That force was applied, and

the whole affair brought to a brilliant outcome, by XII Corps. The operation took exactly 1 week. The

key was supplied by the Corps' second great surprise crossing of the Moselle.*

XII Corps did not even pause to occupy the city of Koblenz, well known to Americans from days

after World War I, which it had cut off at the juncture of the Moselle and Rhine. This chore was left to

VIII Corps. XII Corps spun on its collective heel, and went off on a run, almost at right angles to its

previous axis of advance.

The "scope" section of the Corps After Action Report summarizes the operation as follows:

"While the Eifel area was being cleared down to the Rhine and Moselle Rivers, and the city of

Koblenz at the confluence was pocketed, the Corps regrouped for a change of direction to the southeast

to make a surprise crossing of the Moselle. On the early morning of 14 March, with the 90th Infantry

Division on the left and the 5th Infantry Division on the right, assault crossings were made in the

Hatzenport-Treis area. Surprise was achieved over the enemy, who was engaged with moving in troops

to establish a defensive line along the right bank. By noon of 15 March, the 4th Armored Division had

crossed the river with one combat command in each infantry division bridgehead, and was making good

progress into the high undulating ridge of the Hunsruk. The favorable weather, the improved road net,

and a large expanse of rolling high plateau permitted full exploitation of the power of the armor-infantry

team over an enemy who sought to disengage itself from the XX Corps and the Seventh Army troops

farther south and flee over the Rhine. On 16 March, while the 5th and the 90th Infantry Divisions swept

Southwest, the 4th Armored Division broke out and reached Bad Kreuznach, 35 miles southeast of the

Moselle. On the same day the 89th Infantry Division crossed the Moselle near Bullay, and the 11th

Armored Division, which had just been transferred from the VIII Corps, moved to cross in the 89th

Infantry Division bridgehead."

Again the operations of a particular day are so interesting is to justify excerpting a whole 24-hour

period verbatim from the daily narrative of the same report:

14 March 1945

"Good weather permitted to 362nd Group to fly 20 missions on the XII Corps front. … the

Corps attacked to the southeast across the Moselle River.

"The 90th Infantry Division, on the Corps left flank, jumped off at 0200A and at 0300A the 1st

Battalion and two companies of the 3rd Battalions of both the 357th and 359th Infantries were across

against light resistance. Assault boats were used in the crossing. The 357th Infantry crossed north of

Kattenes and the 359th Infantry crossed at Sterneberg. At 0430A both the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the

357th Infantry were across and Alken was being cleared. By 0630A the whole 357th Infantry was

across and resistance began to stiffen. The 3rd Battalion, 357th Infantry, moved along the river, cleared

Alken by 1000A, and occupied the ground southeast of Alken. At the close of the day it was protecting

the north flank of the bridgehead in the vicinity of Oberfeld. The 1st Battalion, which crossed at Lof, by

nightfall had advanced southeast through Oppenhausen and at 1930A cleared Herschwiesen. The 2nd

Battalion, 357th Infantry, began crossing at 0500A and advanced east, taking Norteshausen and reaching

Pfaffenheck by noon as progress continued. At 1630A a footbridge which had washed away in the 5th

Infantry zone, came downstream into the 90th Infantry Division zone and collided with the Treadway

being built by the 1135th Engineer Combat Group at Hatzenport. This caused a delay; however, the

bridge was completed by dark. The 88th Heavy Ponton Battalion of the 1135th Engineer Combat Group

completed by evening a Class 70 bridge at Moselkern. During the night three tank companies, three TD

companies, and trains of all three regiments, as well as three artillery battalions, had moved across the

river.

"The 5th Infantry Division made its crossing against light resistance. The 11th Infantry did not

receive its assault boats until 0255A. As a result, the crossing did not begin until 0430A. the regiment

advanced slowly. By nightfall the 3rd Battalion cleared Lutz and the regiment assembled in that

vicinity. The 2nd Infantry jumped off on time and by 0240A had two companies across. Enemy in the

vicinity of Treis began giving the 1st Battalion trouble with small arms fire during the morning. A

company of tanks and TDs was sent across the river and in the evening Treis was cleared. The 3rd

Battalion cleared the high ground in its sector in the bridgehead area. The 10th Infantry continued to

harass the south shore in its zone. At 2100A a Treadway Bridge was completed at Muden by the 1135th

Engineer Combat Group. One company of TDs crossed during the day. Foot bridges in the 2nd and

11th Infantry zones were out at 1525A, one by artillery, the other washed away.

"The 89th Infantry Division had only slight changes in its zone. The 3rd Battalion, 355th

Infantry, took Ernst during the morning. Constant enemy fire was received in the vicinity during the day

and night. Patrols were sent out to reconnoiter Ellerz. The 2nd Battalion took Edinger during the day.

Bridging equipment and assault boats began to arrive in the area during the day.

"In a zone of the 76th Infantry Division enemy opposition was practically nonexistent. All the

enemy was cleared in its zone except in the river bands at Traben and Trittenheim.

"At 1045A the 2nd Cavalry Group (less 2nd Cavalry Squadron) was relieved from attachment to

the 76th Infantry Division. The 42nd Cavalry Squadron closed in the vicinity of Kollig at 2250A. At

1700A CCA, 4th Armored Division, closed around Kerben. At 2030A CCR closed in an assembly area

at Gamlen.

"Enemy artillery activity increased during the morning but dropped off again towards evening.

The majority of the fire was 75 mm.

"Operational Directive No 87 was issued, setting H-Hour as 1420A for the 5th and 90th Infantry

Divisions to attack as ordered in Field Order 16. …"

An element not thoroughly covered in the foregoing quotation is the part played by XII Corps

artillery in the Moselle Crossing. Here the XII Corps daily artillery report to the Third Army proves of

assistance. This excellent report, customarily in far greater detail with regards to the subjects of its

special interest than could be in the daily narrative of the after action report for the Corps as a whole,

provides a wealth of material revealing just what every group and battalion on any given day was doing

for the good of the service and the progress of the war. Most important for purposes of a chronicle such

as this, it supplies information which cannot be secured from any series of station lists, or given in any

form, compact enough to include completely in an appendix, i.e., the data as to which groups and

battalions were supporting which other Corps units, day by day. For the Moselle Crossing a typical

Organization for Combat is outlined in the XII Corps "Daily Army Artillery Reports" for 12-14 March

44:

177th FA Gp:

Atchd: 255th FA Bn

276th FA Bn

179th FA Bn

974th FA Bn

G/S Corps

Reinf. 4th Armd Div w/ 1 Lt & 2 Med Bns; later reinf 90th Inf Div

182nd FA Gp;

Atchd: 512th FA Bn

191st FA Bn

771st FA Bn

740th FA Bn

G/S Corps

Reinf 5th Inf Div w/ 1 lt & 2 med Bns

183rd FA Gp;

Atchd: 244th FA Bn

738th FA Bn

731st FA Bn

G/S Corps

33rd FA Gp;

Atchd: 945th FA Bn

775th FA Bn

273rd FA Bn

G/S Corps

Reinf 76th Inf Div w/ 1 med Bn

Reinf 89th inf Div w/ 1 med Bn

Hq & Hq Btry, XII Corps Arty (Fire Direction Center)

Atchd: 286th FA Obsn Bn (-"B" Btry)

734th FA Bn

G/S Corps

Direct fire Z/A (Zone of Action)90th & 5th Inf Divs

410th FA Gp (FDC):

Atchd: Hq & Hq Btry 288th FA Obsn Bn (+"B" Btry 286th FA Obsn Bn)

G/S Corps

Direct fire Z/A 90th & 5th Inf Divs.

Unlike the Rhine Crossing a week later, the Moselle Crossing featured thourough artillery

preparation. As will be seen immediately above, the 182nd Field Artillery Group was assigned to fire,

under direction of the 410th Field Artillery Group Fire Direction Center, not only in general support of

the Corps but also in the zone of action of the 5th Infantry Division, to support its Crossing, with one

light and two medium battalions in addition to the 5th Infantry Division's regular "Divarty." A first

lieutenant and one of the XII Corps 155 mm howitzer battalions – Lt Clayton C. Uran, a battery

executive with the 771st Field Artillery Battalion – has left a record of a representative experience in

this operation:

"March 12, 1945, at Moselkern, Germany, we were in an area jammed and packed with artillery

battalions; we were told that we were in position to help support the 5th Division's crossing of the

Moselle. We were in position two days and hadn't accomplished any firing at all. Engineers were

constantly bringing up equipment to aid in the river crossing. A patch of woods across the road to our

right was used as a bivouac for the engineers. In moving into this position we were carrying so much

ammunition as a basic load that it had to be shuttled. We would leave approximately 200 rounds behind,

which we could not possibly carry, with guards and markers on it, and upon arriving at the new position,

send back for the 200 rounds. The ammo trucks at the battery position were unloaded and sent back for

the 200 rounds. In the early hours of the 14th … we were notified that we would be firing a 30 minute

preparation for the Moselle Crossing. The gun sections were alerted, ammunition brought up, and other

necessary preparations were made for accomplishing the mission. Firing data was sent down from Fire

Direction about 30 minutes in advance of the missions. The data was entered on Recorder's Sheets for

10 missions, to be fired at three-minute intervals. This would call for fast and faultless work at both the

exec post and gun sections. The exec post was in a pyramidal tent, straw floored, with a looted German

stove throwing out heat. Phones and wires were leading every of which way. With the recorder's sheets

in front of me, I was sending the missions to the guns; the assistant exec was handling the Fire Direction

phone. As I remember, firing started at 0100 – and at this time all hell broke loose. All the watches in

the area were synchronized, and the rounds from many battalions went off together. I understand we

were firing on enemy's strong points across the Moselle. All of our 10 missions were accomplished

smoothly and without delay. At two o'clock on the afternoon of the 14th, we moved to a position only

10 yards from the banks of the Moselle. (We were still on the North Side.) Our Battalion CP was near

Karden and Meden. During the march to this position over a winding and narrow road along the river,

the battery was halted while an engineer crew was emplacing a ferry across the Moselle. During the

halt, the battery received enemy artillery fire. Due to the dispersion of the vehicles, and the scattering of

the men, no damage was done. After about 15 minutes, the battery was able to proceed to its position.

It was at this position that the men had their first taste of the famous Moselle wine. We remained in this

position until midnight of the 16th. We crossed the 5th Division's bridgehead at about 0400 hours. The

men were groggy from lack of sleep."

In the zone of the 90th Infantry Division Crossing, artillery was also hard at work. A candidate

for the title of neatest trick of the week is reported by Major Frank E. Willard, of the 738th Field

Artillery Battalion:

"About the 15th of March 1945, the 738th Field Artillery was assigned to the 183rd Group

reinforcing the fires of the 90th Infantry Division in the Moselle River crossing. We crossed the river

and went into position in the vicinity of the town of Ganshof. We lost all communication with any

higher headquarters because we got ahead of them and no communication had been established yet

across the river. The Germans were shelling the town when the Command Post was established. The

4th Armored Division was passing through the 90th but was being held up about 2 miles up the road by

antitank fire. There was an artillery liaison plane of the 177th Field Artillery Group flying in the

vicinity of our Command Post. He got in communication with us and told us that he could see where the

fire was coming from which was holding up the 4th Armored advance. Our own club plane also

identified these guns but he warned us that our own troops were within 200 yards of them. He said he

could see the panels our troops were displaying. The 177th Group plane broke in and said that he

thought it would be okay to shoot if we didn't shoot short. We put a round out from one gun and the

177th Group pilot adjusted our fire. We fired a total of seven rounds including the adjustment and

knocked out three towed 88 mm German guns. I went up the next afternoon after our troops had taken

that ground and saw the knocked out German guns myself.

"From this same position, later the same afternoon, we fired another interesting mission. Our

pilot saw German vehicles assembling in a clump of woods along a prominent highway. He called for

fire on his target. We couldn't get clearance because of the difficulties in communication but we shot it

anyway. We fired 40 rounds of 200 pound shells into the woods. The next day the Battalion

Commanding Officer and myself went up to look at the results of this concentration. We counted the

chassis of 15 burned out vehicles plus much horse-drawn and miscellaneous equipment. The Polish

Displaced Persons in that vicinity told us that our concentration had killed 50 Germans who had been

evacuated."

During the operations along the Moselle the 273rd Field Artillery Battalion broke into print by

firing, on 16 March 45, XII Corps Artillery's 2,000,000th artillery round. This outfit, commanded by Lt

Col Milton L. Acuff, of Algood, Tenn, was a 155 mm gun battalion. The gun, a Long Tom of Baker

Battery, was emplaced northwest of Buren, and it dropped the corps' 2,000,000 round on some deserving

Krauts near Tellig.**

Other nominees for a little morale-lifting publicity, from among XII Corps troops involved in the

Moselle Crossing, are suggested in a letter dated 16 March 45, sent to the Nancy edition of the Stars &

Stripes:

"DEAR MAIL CALL:

"You have printed several letters from Artillery outfits telling of their firing records, so why not

a line for the Combat Engineers?

"Members of the 1135th Engineer Combat Group built three Class 40 bridges on D-Day of the

Crossing of the Moselle, 14 March. As far as we know that is a record for any one Group.

"One of these, a heavy ponton, was built in the remarkable time of four hours and 10 minutes by

the 88th Heavy Ponton Battalion. That ought to be another record.

"The other two were treadways, one built in 8 1/2 hours and the other in 11 hours, by the 150th

Engineer Combat Battalion.

"Remember, this was across a 400-foot-wide river and that the enemy had observation of bridge

sites.

Sincerely yours, etc."

History faileth to reveal whether this well-deserved "plug" got into the public prints, or not.

The Kraut spelling of this by the way, is Mosel, as will be noted on various maps.

** Mr. Julian W Moody, formerly with 273rd Field Artillery Battalion, and compiler of Mission Accomplished, the

Pictorial Memoirs of the 273rd Field Artillery Battalion in Combat, World War II, contributes the exact data on XII Corps'

2,000,000th round: "Fired by S/Sgt Adam's gun crew of B Battery, at 1520 hours on 16 March 45. Powder charge 'super',

fuse 'quick'. Fired in registration on a crossroads about 600 m north of village of Teilig. B Battery was located along a road

running NW out of town of Beuren (500 m out of town) near the Moselle River. The actual map coordinates on this

position are 552.538-367.022."

SIX DIVISIONS ABREAST, XII CORPS POURED ACROSS THE

MOSELLE, 14 MAR-18 MAR 45

(1, 2, & 3) Starting with assault crossings during the night of 13-14 March 45, by the 5th and a 90th Infantry Divisions on XII corps' east

flank, the surprise attack across the Moselle kept river progress in the following days by crossings affected by the 4th Armored Division,

89th Infantry Division, 11th Armored Division, and 76th Infantry Division the last passing over the river on a team march at the extreme

southwest flank in the XII Corps' line. Armor and infantry drove irresistably for Bingen, Mainz and Worms - and the Rhine. (Pictures (2)

and (3) taken by T/Sgt Millard McKee, 315th Engineer Combat Battalion, 90th Infantry Division; (4) The 5th Infantry Division advances:

Headquarters Company 2nd Battalion, 11th Infantry Regiment moving on Lutz, Germany, 15 March. (5) The 90th Infantry Division

advances: 1st Battalion, 359th Infantry Regiment and 773rd Tank Battalion in Mainz, 22 March. (6) The 4th Armored Division advances:

vehicles of the 66th Armored Field Artillery Battalion scooted by a burning German truck on its way to Worms, 20 March. (7) The 4th

Armored Division advances: tanks and trucks of the division weigh down a ponton bridge in the 89th Infantry Division zone, with Alf,

Germany, in the background, 17 March.

2. Six Divisions

General Eddie has spoken feelingly, since the war, on the subject of a corps commander's job

when his corps contains six divisions. "Five divisions," he observes, "keep the corps commander busy

and under continuous strain. His telephone is ringing all the time, day and night. But directing a corps,

which has six divisions in it is, for him, like driving six horses abreast while standing astraddle on the

center pair – and never able to stop or get off. …" the period between the Moselle and the Rhine was

one of those in which XII Corps had, in addition to all of the artillery, engineers, and every other sort of

Corps units, – 6 divisions. Station List number 68, 20 March 45 contains the following formidable list

of divisional assignments (with the 2nd Cavalry Group slipping in as a temporary addition to a division):

4th Armd Div

Olympic

Maj Gen Gaffey

489th AAA AW (SP)

Lubricate

Lt Col Murphy

495th Eng Trdw Br Co

Capt Teagle

704th TD Bn (SP)

Harpoon

Lt Col Bidwell

444th QM Trk Co

3804th QM Trk Co

1st Plat 16th F Hosp

Maj Petinga

11th Armd Div

Batman

Brig Gen Dager

575th AAA AW Bn

Halfsword

Lt Col Baker

705th TD Bn

Highseed

Maj Dibble

3rd Plat 16th F Hosp

Maj Wilkins

381st QM Trk Co

659th QM Trk Co

5th Inf Div

Dynamite

Maj Gen Irwin

449th AAA AW Bn (Mbl)

Atone

Lt Col Kenison

Co B 91st Cml Mortar Bn

Capt Grove

803rd TD Bn (SP)

Victim

Lt Col Goodwin

737th Tk Bn

Hermit

Lt Col Kroschel

1st Plat 30th F Hosp

Maj Mulligan

76th Inf Div

Triangle

Maj Gen Schmidt

778th AAA AW Bn (SP)

Chowder

Lt Col Arthur

808th TD Bn

Hight

Lt Col McDonald

1st Plat 60th F Hosp

Maj Troxler

89th Inf Div

Tuxedo

Maj Gen Finley

550th AAA AW Bn (Mbl)

High Pocket

Lt Col Kimm

Co A 91st Cml Mortar Bn

Lt Higgins

602nd TD Bn

Corsair

Maj Conlin

2nd Plat 16th F Hosp

Maj Tulsky

90th Inf Div

Unicorn

Brig Gen Earnest

2nd Cav Gp

Thoroughbred

ol Reed

2nd Cav Sq (Mcz)

Hideout

Lt Col Easton

42nd Cav SQ (Mcz)

Hidden

Lt Col Hargis

Co A 808th TD Bn

537 AAA AW Bn

Mayfair

Lt Col Recer

Co C 91st Chm Mortar Bn

Capt Horton

773rd TD Bn

Hellfire

Lt Col Speiss

712th Tk Bn

Motor

Lt Col Kadrovsky

1st Plat 59th F Hosp

Maj Forman

Among these will be seen such veteran battlefield attachments of the corps as the 4th Armored

and 5th Infantry Divisions, the latter now on the very brink of its most spectacular operation of World

War II. But besides these may be noted some newcomers soon to be also of the very bone and sinew of

XII Corps.

Assigned to XII Corps on the day of the second Moselle Crossing, and destined to be a part of

the corps without interruption from then on until long after the end of the war, was one of the greatest

fighting units of the War in Europe, – the 90th Infantry Division.*

The 90th Infantry Division might at this juncture be receiving its introduction to XII Corps, but it

was no stranger to war. It had beaten the senior organization into battle, when the "Tough

'Ombres"(wearing on the left shoulder the red T-O which originally stood for Texas-Oklahoma) hit the

Normandy beaches on D-Day, and were in battle for 53 unbroken days thereafter. Indeed, since the 90th

Infantry Division of World War I had fought at St. Mihiel and in the Meuse-Argonne, the outfit might

be said to have beaten XII Corps into combat by one whole war. Since D-Day it had taken part in the

race across France, the siege of Metz, the smashing of the Seigfried Line and other distinguished

operations to carry the war into Germany. It was to accomplish some of its most noted feats while a part

of XII Corps, as will be found recorded in words and pictures further along in this chronicle.

The 11th Armored Division joined the corps a few days later (20 March 45) than the 90th

Infantry Division, but, with one brief period away, it was also to be with the corps until after the end of

the war. It had not been introduced to battle as early as either the division it served beside or the corps

of which it was to be a thundering part. But it had had a rude introduction to warfare:

"The 11th was assigned to the Lorient pocket," says the I & E historical pamphlet for the

division, "on the day first elements of the division landed at Cherbourg. But that day was 16 December,

when Field Marshall Gred von Rundstedt unleashed his massive counteroffensive in the Ardennes. That

scrapped the original plans. Tanks, halftracks, armored cars, peeps and trucks took off in a dash through

the rubbled towns of Normandy, the Seine Valley, northeast through the Argonne to the banks of the

Meuse River. Bitter cold, rain and snow made the march a rugged test of armored skill.

"On the Meuse, elements of the division were tactically deployed for the first time. Assigned to

guard the river from Givet to Verdun, CCA, commanded by Brig Gen Willard A. Holbrook Jr. was

divided into two task forces for patrol activity. All bridges across the river were prepared for demolition

in the event Germans broke through.

"In the meantime, the sole supply corridor to the embattled Americans in Bastogne was being

threatened by German counterattacks. Again the 11th changed its plans, turned the Meuse River defense

over to the 17th Airborne Division, and on 29 December roared 85 miles to an assembly area near

Neufchateau. Without a pause, the division launched into its first action. Attacking abreast, CCA and

Col Wesley W Yale's CCB jumped off at 0730 next day with the 51st Cavalry Reconnaissance

Squadron. Within an hour, the drive ran smack into an enemy attack headed for the highway. The

fighting was fierce and bitter. One CCB tank force punched its way into Lavaselle and seized the high

ground near Brul and Haumont. Despite a heavy artillery barrage that night, all gains were held.

"Reserve Command, under Col Virgil Bell, struck next day, grabbed key terrain southwest of

Pinsamount. Pressing on to Acul, CCR doughs were pinned down by heavy enemy artillery and mortar

fire.

"Twice, in the slugging battle, CCB armored doughs tried to seize the town of Chenogne but

each time superior forces drove them off. The third and final assault was launched on New Year's

morning. Tanks and artillery laid down massed fire while the infantry followed up. The town was

completely secured by noon. While CCB regrouped, 13 artillery battalions hurled a paralyzing barrage

of fire on the heavily defended Bois des Valets. Armored doughs penetrated the thick woods and

cleaned it out. Seizure of this key point doomed the German effort to cut the supply route. CCB next

caught Mande St Etienne in a pincers move 2 January 45, and held it against a powerful counterattack.

"Screened by harassing artillery fire, the division was relieved the next day by the 17th Airborne

Division. The Thunderbolt Division – 11th Armored – had tackled two ace Nazi divisions, punched

them back 6 miles in five freezing days, cleared 30 square miles of rugged terrain, liberated more than a

dozen towns and ended the threat to the supply route. The division suffered heavy casualties in its

combat baptism but it had inflicted greater losses on the enemy. After nearly 2 1/2 years of training, the

11th had earned its Spurs. …

After this "rugged" baptism of fire, the 11th Armored Division had proceeded via the key town

of Houffalize (where early on 18 January 45 elements of the division represented Third Army in its

juncture with First Army to seal off the remains of the Bulge), thence through the Seigfried Line, and

onward, as teammate of the 90th Infantry Division, to the Rhine river bank and its first contact with XII

Corps at Mayen, as mentioned before.

Earliest of the three "new" divisions to be assigned to XII Corps during the phases dealt with in

this part of the narrative, the 89th Infantry Division was also to be most briefly with the corps. It was

picked up on 3 March, and lost again 19 days later to VIII Corps. But that short association was an

historic one, a period packed with headline – and front line – events. The 89th Infantry Division, like

the 90th, had fought in the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne battles of World War I. Like the 11th

Armored Division's introduction to combat, that of the 89th Infantry Division's was also "rugged," but in

its case mostly because of the difficult terrain of the Moselle Valley, where it was first committed to

action under guidance of XII Corps Headquarters and units. The men of the 89th Infantry Division

reached battle positions along the Sauer on 11 March 45, and were fighting among ravines and

precipices of the northwestern bank of the Moselle the following day. The "Rolling W" shoulder patch

became familiar to many members of XII Corps along the Moselle and in the Palatinate; – they were to

encounter it again under very different circumstances around Rheims, France, after the war, when

personnel of the corps were streaming back through the great Assembly Area Camps of Lucky Strike,

Old Gold and Twenty Grande, which the men of the 89th Infantry Division would be called upon to

operate.

* And on this same date G3 section of XII corps Headquarters published the mimeographed "breakdown" of the division, which fortunately

has been preserved in the Corps records. It is reproduced here because it will serve as a sample of all such breakdowns, and could be of no

better XII Corps comrade in arms:

Branch

Unit

Code Name

Commanding Officer

DIVISION

90TH Inf

Unicorn 6

Brig Gen Earnest

Asst Div Cmdr

Col Tully

GENERAL STAFF

Chief of Staff

Unicorn 5

Col Whitchomb

Unicorn 1

Maj Lynch

Unicorn 2

Lt Col Boswell

Unicorn 3

Lt Col Booth

Unicorn 4

Lt Col Andrews

SPECIAL STAFF

Adj Gen

Unicorn (Rear 7)

Lt Col Dix

Chaplain

Unicorn (Rear 7)

Lt Col Wilson

Chem Warfare Serv

Unicorn 24

Lt Col Schepps

Div QM

Unicorn (QDUM)

Lt Col Thompson

Fin O

Unicorn (Rear 7)

Lt Col Cooper

Ord O

Utensil

Lt Col Sinclair

Inspec Gen

Unicorn (Rear 7)

Maj Babbin

Judg Adv

Unicorn (Rear 7)

Maj Brick Jr

Div Sig O

Unicorn 10

Lt Col Hornung

Div Surg

Unicorn 16

Lt Col Andre

Spec Serv O

Unicorn (Rear 36)

Maj Smith

CAO

Unicorn (Mil Gov)

Lt Col Russell

Div Engr O

Unicorn 15

Lt Col Gilchrist

CAVALRY

90th Rcn Tr

Underwood

Capt Dye

INFANTRY

357th Inf Regt

Union

Lt Col Mason

1st Bn

Union Red

Lt Col De Puy

2nd Bn

Union White

Lt Col Rossow

3rd Bn

Union Blue

Maj Warden

358th Inf Regt

Utopia

Col Bealke

1st Bn

Utopia Red

Lt Col Nichols Jr.

2nd Bn

Utopia White

Lt Col Lytle

3rd Bn

Utopia Blue

Maj Bryan

359th Inf Regt

Unique

Col Bell

1st Bn

Unique Red

Maj Fisk

2nd Bn

Unique White

Maj Miller

3rd Bn

Unique Blue

Lt Col Godding

FIELD ARTILLERY

90th Inf Div Arty

Universe

Brig Gen Bixby

343rd FA Bn

Urban

Lt Col Reimers

344th FA Bn

United

Maj Conn

345th FA Bn

Umber

Lt Col Norris

915th FA Bn

Upstart

Lt Col Hughes

ENGINEER

315th Engr Bn

Utiity

Lt Col Gilchrist

MEDICAL

315th Med Bn

Undercut

Lt Col Gower

ORDNANCE

790th Ord Co

Utensil

Capt Connor

SIGNAL

90th Sig Co

Uncanny

Capt Montgomery

QUARTERMASTER

90th QM Co

Uranium

Capt Floyd

SPECIAL TROOPS

Hq Spes Tr

Unicorn 34

Lt Col O'Bryant

MILITARY POLICE

MP Plat

Unicorn 37

1st Lt Peterson

In the original there follows a list of attachments to the division already reproduced above.

3. The Nahe

Next river for the XII Corps to cross was the Nahe. During the week following the successful

assault on a disorganized and surprised Moselle Line, the corps, "with the 4th and 11th Armored

Divisions preceding, the 90th and the 5th Infantry Divisions following, the 89th Infantry Division

echeloned to the right rear, and the 2nd Cavalry Group on the left rear along the Rhine, swept southeast

through the Hunsruck, across the Nahe River, and turned eastward into the open Rheinpfalz plateau."

The pattern of this grandiose enterprise was now clear for anyone, particularly the Germans, to

see. For once Third Army's After Action Report is more enthusiastic and extensive in its recital of the

XII Corps operations during this period than the corps' own report quoted in the preceding paragraph:

"XII Corps' drive across the enemy's rear … threw the enemy into a panic, but despite hurried

reinforcements he was unable to halt the penetration. By 16 March, XII Corps had seized the key cities

of Kirn, Bad Kreuznach and Bingen and had linked up with XX Corps, thus pocketing remnants of ten

enemy divisions in the central Hunsruck Mountains. …" Here are typical extracts given the story of XX

Corps' next few days from the Third Army point of view:

16 March 44. "Continuing its whirlwind drive to the south, the 4th Armored Division (XII

Corps) gained up to 18 miles, with CCA closing to the Nahe River in the vicinity of Bretzenheim while

CCB crossed the Nahe River near Bad Mnnster, then continued south through Hallgarten. The attached

10th and 359th Infantry Regiments were well in advance of other infantry units, with the 359th Infantry

in Simmern at the close of the period, while the 10th Infantry captured Blankenrath and Panzweiler.

The 90th Infantry Division(less the 359th Infantry) reduced the enemy and the far eastern section of the

corps zone, clearing Bad Salzig and Boppard. To the west, the 5th Infantry Division (less the 10th

Infantry) gained 7 miles, taking Buch, Kastellaun and Hundheim in its mopping up drive to the rear of

the 4th Armored Division. By this time the 4th Armored Division was cutting up enemy units on a

large-scale, while the 5th and 90th Infantry Divisions were mopping up and taking large numbers of

prisoners. The 89th Infantry Division enlarged its bridgehead over the Moselle River, gaining 4 1/2

miles and taking Burg, Briedel and Ellenz, while the 76th Infantry Division maintained its positions on

the north bank of the Moselle River in the western section of the XII Corps zone. The 2nd Cavalry

Group screened the corps north flank, while maintaining contact with VIII Corps. …"

17 March 44. "XII Corps' spearhead continued to be its 4th Armored Division, followed up by

the 5th and 90th Infantry Divisions. Gains of six miles were made by the 4th Armored Division after it

passed through Bad Kreuznach. Three minor counterattacks were easily repulsed by the division. The

5th Infantry Division gained five miles with the 2nd and 11th Infantry Regiments while the 10th Infantry

was relieved from 4th Armored Division and reverted to the 5th Infantry Division. The 359th (90th

Infantry Division) continued to support the 4th Armored Division, while the remainder of the 90th

Infantry Division gained two miles, mopping up and clearing the enemy to the Rhine River. After

closing in corps zone, the 11th Armored Division passed through the 89th Infantry Division, gaining

more than 15 miles. At the end of the period, forward elements of the 11th Armored Division were

about 10 miles northwest of the 4th Armored Division. After being motorized, the 355th Infantry (89th

Infantry Division) followed closely behind the 11th Armored Division, while the remainder of the 89th

Infantry Division pushed forward 3 miles. To the west, the 76th Infantry Division maintained its

position north of the Moselle River, while in the eastern extremity of the corps zone the 2nd Cavalry

Group continued to screen the flank along the Rhine River. …"

18 March 44. "Along the Rhine River in the northern part of the XII Corps zone, the 2nd

Cavalry Group patrolled aggressively while the 90th Infantry Division cleared ground south along the

river beyond Bingen which was under attack by the end of the period. The 4th Armored Division made

gains south of the Nahe River while fanning out to the east and west in order to reduce bypassed

concentrations of the enemy. Soberheim and Reckerhausen were captured while the important town of

Bad Kreuznach was cleared. Gaining 8 miles, the 11th Armored Division continued to advance rapidly.

CCA forded the Nahe River, capturing Meddersheim, while CCB crossed the same River 5 miles to the

west and captured Becherbach. The 355th Infantry (89th Infantry Division) was attached to 11th

Armored Division and followed it closely, while the remainder of the 89th Infantry Division reduced

enemy troops bypassed by the armored column. Crossing the Moselle River, the 304th Infantry (76th

Infantry Division) gained 1 mile while the remainder of the division patrolled north of the River."

Some color for these operations may be gleaned from an account of the Nahe Crossing by the 1st

Lt Max A. Stricker, of the 166th Engineer Combat Battalion:

"The 4th Armored Division had crossed the Nahe River with a few tanks and TDs by means of a

railroad bridge at a little town south of Bad Kreuznach called Bad Mnnster, on 16 March 45. Our

mission was to plank the rails so that vehicles could cross.

"The 3rd platoon of Company C of the 166th Engineer Combat Battalion was to do the job. We

moved up two or three miles through a huge woods, escorted by a convoy of 12 light tanks, as we

weren't sure where the enemy was. We had six trucks, with men and lumber to do the job. I was in a

jeep. We met no resistance. We arrived around 1000 and finished the job by 1600. The bridge was 960

feet long, one way. This was just an expediency until a proper bridge could be built at Bad Kreuznach.

While we were working a few Jerry planes came over and strafed, but we had no casualties.

"On 19 March we built a Bailey bridge at Bad Kreuznach. The town had offered little resistance,

and we pulled in right behind the 359th Infantry Regiment of the 90th Infantry Division which had

cleared it. A few of the infantry foot troops had crossed on the wreckage of the old bridge, while the

rest of the 359th waited for us to complete the bridge. We started around 1000. It was a triple single,

because of the distance, which was 110 feet. All Bailies are built for Class 40's. Up to 90 feet, you can

use a double single. From 90 to 120, you must use a triple single. Platoons 1 and 3 of C Company did

the job, and finished it around 1600, which was very good time, though the job was fairly simple. The

only thing which was noteworthy about this incident was that we followed the 359th into town so

closely."

4. Simmern and Bad Kreuznach

On the day last mentioned above, by Lt Striker, XII Corps CP moved forward to the little town

of Simmern, in the midst of the rolling wooded mountains of the Hunsruk. A few days before, Mayen

had seemed close enough to the war. Now, as usual, XII Corps command began to fret at finding itself

left so far behind the fighting, Mayen seemed untenable for purposes of directing the corps' second

approach to the Rhine.

Simmern had not suffered too badly from passage of XII Corps troops, as Col Murray recalls it:

"a pretty fair town – shot up a little. It was a pretty big town as far as I can remember, about 20,000

population. CP was set up in Landrat building (equivalent to American County Court House) on the

eastern edge of town. Officers and EM lived in private residences. Landrat office looked like an

ordinary two-story stucco building – had two wings coming out on either side forming three sides of a

square – it was in pretty good shape and had water, heat and lights."

Simmern, in those fast-moving times, was good for only three days. On 22 March 45 – a most

historic date, as will be seen presently – the CP packed up and moved to what was probably its most

luxurious accommodations of the entire combat period, – the Palast Kurhaus at Bad Kreuznach. "Bad

Kreuznach was larger than Simmern – 40 to 50,000 population – but shot up very badly and bombed.

The building we were in was a large resort hotel scarcely damaged, large enough to accommodate the

Corps CP and billet all officers and most of the enlisted men. Hotel had its own water and light system;

there was a 65,000 watt generator built underground. Baths were kaput. General Eddie was billeted in

the home of Herr Schneider, who made lenses. The CP Hotel was on an island in the Nahe River and

had a canal or a creek nearby (the Muhlenteich). There was one bridge. It was a very large hotel and it

was in the better residential district of town. Prominent doctors had lived there. There was one

interesting thing about it and that was that the room where the War Room set up was once the office of

Kaiser Wilhelm during the first World War. There was a brass plaque on the door to that effect. …"

When Col Murray uses the past tense in referring to that plaque, he does so advisedly. There

was one there; there isn't one now. Where it isn't now is probably known possibly to only one former

member of the Corps headquarters. Upon its mysterious disappearance hangs one of the noisiest causes

celebres of Headquarters, XII U.S. Army Corps. Let Col Lieber testify to such facts as are generally

known: "Room 115 (the one assigned to the War Room) had a sign on it saying that during the campaign

of 1918 Kaiser Wilhelm II had occupied this space with his field headquarters. When Gen Patton came

(to the XII Corps CP) he wanted some pictures taken on the occasion. Gen Eddy suggested that perhaps

he would like to have them taken in the room the Kaiser used in the last war. They went down there and

all was rather dark. My door was open, and I heard Gen Eddy say,'General there is a brass plate on the

door right here.' they stopped and the next thing Gen Eddy yelled,'What the hell has become of that

plate?' The plate had been there between five and six the previous evening, and somewhere around nine,

Gilbertson (Lt "Gil" Gilbertson of the War Room) took someone out to show the plate. At 8:30 the next

morning it was gone. "Gen Canine announced an immediate shakedown inspection of the baggage of

every officer and soldier in the headquarters, but this unequaled souvenir of the War in Europe never

came to light.*

But although the Forward Echelon of XII Corps Headquarters was kept up as close to the actual

fighting as any Corps headquarters, and closer than most, it was still not close enough to satisfy the

corps commander when great things were impending. The previously worked out concept of a

"Command Group" which could be thrown forward into the divisional areas was again put into effect.

For the first time since St. Max, back in France, Gen Eddy took his key staff members up front with

him, first from Mayen to Treis, 17 March, then the following day to Kastellaun. On this latter date the

situation was formalized in a memorandum issued over Col Lieber's signature, "Command Group

Displacement":

"1. Command Group. a. The following staff officers and assistants will be prepared at all times

to displace on two hours' notice to an advance command post.

CG Section complete, including mess

C/S and 2 EM

G2, one assistant, and 2 EM

G3, two assistants, and 4 EM

G4 and 1 EM

Arty O, one assistant, and 3 EM

Sig O and 1 EM

b. Each section will carry the minimum equipment, including mapboards and typewriters,

required for essential operations (orders, situation reports, and periodic reports). G2 will carry a

mimeograph for joint use with G3, and G3 will carry reproduction equipment for overlays.

c. In addition, each section named will furnish a guide, who will report to the Headquarters

Commandant with personal equipment, 30 minutes after call.

d. Truck transportation will be pooled. Section chiefs will send a representative to the motor

officer when section equipment is loaded.

"2. Services. a. The Signal Officer will provide the necessary message center and signal center

personnel.

b. Headquarters Commandant will provide an officer and personnel to operate CP services,

including joint mess, MP guards, motors, lights and latrines.

c. PM will mark route and patrol traffic.

"3. The minimum staff group named above will be augmented for special situations. Sections

not listed in the above group will be prepared to furnish a minimum operating team and equipment on

two hours' notice. Liaison officers will continue operating from the Forward Echelon until called to

Advance CP."

The paragraph in the above which caused the major griping and groaning was "2". It was all

very well for the DC/S to write the "Signal Officer will provide the necessary message center and signal

center personnel," but on the ground this had to be carried out by the sweat and ingenuity of the special

staff personnel and that of the 93rd Signal Battalion and the 3255th Signal Service Company. Even

when the situation was eased by bringing up the Rear Echelon to the same town as the Forward Echelon

(as was affected at Bad Kreuznach on 23 March 45), the strain on the various headquarters services

occasioned by splitting the headquarters into three parts instead of two, was considerable. As a matter

of fact, at Kastellaun, Gen Eddy was only to require this organization twice more, once that Undenheim,

when he had to be within sight of the Rhine Crossing; and for a final time, unintentionally, at

Lauterbach, as a result of the unfriendly activities of the 6th SS Mountains Division (German). But

these occasions belong in later parts of this narrative.

* Best circumstantial evidence is that of a sergeant in the War Room, who clearly recalls handing a screwdriver to a certain officer -- whose

name, though surprising, for obvious reasons shall not be mentioned here -- at an appropriate hour to fit into Col Lieber's time schedule,

and for just about long enough to unscrew that famous plate from the door of room 115. GD.

5. Wind-up of the Palatinate Campaign

Sweeping eastward from the Nahe, XII Corps' forward units burst out onto the plain of the Rhine

and headed for two important German cities on the West Bank of the river, – Mainz and Worms. It also

headed for a certain little village, Oppenheim, fated to be more important to the Muse of History than

either of these.

"Although the enemy attempted to throw up a line of defense west of Mainz," says the Third

Army After Action Report "to form a bridgehead for the withdrawal of his troops across the Rhine, he

never succeeded. What was intended to be an organized withdrawal quickly became a rout, the enemy's

fleeing columns being attacked constantly from the air and cut to ribbons by the Third U.S. Army's

armor. Infantry mopping-up teams of followed closely behind the tanks, taking thousands of prisoners

in the wake of the charging armor. The German First and Seventh Armies were decimated, with a loss

of 81,692 prisoners of war, and all territory to the Rhine River as far south as Speyer was cleared."

The two critical days which saw the end of this campaign were 20-21 March 45, and from the

Corps After Action Report comes details of who captured what, when and with which:

"20 March 1945. a. The 362nd Group, XIX TAC, flew 16 missions with excellent results

reported. The XII Corps continued the advance to the east with infantry clearing the enemy from the

zone, following the advancing armor.

b. CCB, 4th Armored Division, attacked at 0600A. It cleared Offenheim, but ran into an enemy

force of 4 SPs, one tank, and 100 infantry at Waldheim. The resistance collapsed quickly and at 1200A

CCB had cleared Freimersheim and was passing through Alzey. At 1720A it entered Worms and spent

the rest of the day mopping up. At 1730A contact was made with the 11th Armored Division. CCA

also moved out at 0600A, cleared Flonheim, Albig, Monsheim, moving through Alzey. Resistance was

light. The 10th Infantry, moving in rear of these two columns, opened its regimental CP at Alzey and

assembled in that vicinity. CCR move to Wendelsheim. The 4th Armored Division CP opened in Frei-

Laubersheim. The 90th Infantry Division jumped off towards Mainz at 0700A. No opposition was

received until troops reached the high ground overlooking the city. The 3rd Battalion, 358th Infantry, at

1700A was in the Oberulmer woods and moved off from the high ground northeast of Mainz. The 2nd

Battalion took Schwabenheim and Gros Winterheim. The 359th Infantry moved without opposition

until the 3rd Battalion entered Nieder Oln where it was subjected to small arms fire and 88 mm fire. At

1215A an artillery concentration was placed on the town and at 1600A the town was secured. The 2nd

Battalion met and overcame opposition in Zarnheim, and at 1700A was in Ebersheim. The 357th

Infantry moved up and assembled the 1st Battalion in Vendersheim, the 2nd Battalion at Wolfsheim, 3rd

Battalion at Parenheim. At 1300A the division CP opened at Spendlingen. Enemy in the 5th Infantry

zone still consisted of small disorganized groups. The 3rd Battalion, 11th Infantry, marched from Bad

Kreuznach to Worrstadt. The 1st Battalion was in Rommersheim. The 2nd Battalion occupied

Spiesheim and Enscheim. The 2nd Battalion and three Battalions of the 2nd Infantry moved out north of

the Nahe River from Sobernheim and cleared their zone from Rehborn south and east to Oberhausen.

The 2nd Battalion was assembled near Hallgarten. At 0900A, CCB, 11th Armored Division moved out

from the high ground east of Rockenhausen and by 1200A had entered Dreisen. The column there

turned south, clearing Collheim and several small towns, reaching Offsteind by 1750A against light

resistance. By dark the column was near Klein Niedesheim. CCA cleared Marienthal and Dennenfels

where it received some AT fire and mortar fire. It reached Driesen at 1500A. Here CCA turned north

and took Albisheim, Marxheim, and at 1730A advanced through Monsheim. There was considerable

enemy air activity over the zone of the 11th Armored Division; three planes were knocked down by the

AA units. The division CP opened at Winnweiler at 1545A. CCR assembled at Rockenhausen. At

0915A the 89th Infantry Division CP opened at Rhannen. The 353rd Infantry and the 354th Infantry

continued following up the 11th Armored Division. The 2nd Battalion, 353rd Infantry, reached

Barnsweiler. The 3rd Battalion occupied Meddersheim, the 2nd Battalion reached Barmweiler. Little

opposition was encountered. The 354th Infantry was in the vicinity of Becherbach at the close of the

day. At 2000A the 417th RCT of the 76th Infantry Division had completed the relief of the 2nd Cavalry

Squadron, at which time the division passed to VIII Corps control. By 1730A the 304th Infantry had

cleared the road from Mulheim to Buchendeuren against no resistance. The 2nd Cavalry Squadron, 2nd

Cavalry Group, after being relieved by the 417th Infantry, assemble that Warmsroth. The 42nd Cavalry

Squadron crossed the Nahe River and screened the left flank of the 90th Infantry Division from Bingen

to Gaulzesheim, where contact was made with a 354th Infantry, 89th Infantry Division, during the night.

"There was a slight increase in enemy artillery activity in the 4th Armored, 5th Infantry, and 90th

Infantry Division zones, especially in the bridge site area at Bretzenheim. The rest of the Corps front

was quiet. …"

"21 March 1945. a. The Corps continued clearing the enemy in its zone to the Rhine River.

Excellent weather prevailed with good air support by the 262nd Group, XIX TAC.

b. The 2nd Cavalry Group cleared its area along the west bank of the Rhine River from Bingen

to Rudenheim. Bingen was cleared by 1100A. At 0100A CCA, 4th Armored Division, joined CCB in

Worms. After being relieved by the 3rd Battalion, 10th Infantry, both commands pushed to the north to

clear their respective zones. At 1700A CCA reported its zone clear. Little opposition was received in

mopping up. At 1200A the 3rd Battalion, 10th Infantry, was in Worms, 1st Battalion in Bermesheim

and a 2nd Battalion in Weinheim and Mauchenheim. The 90th Infantry Division received a counter

attack during the night of 20-21 March in the vicinity of the woods near Hohnheim vicinity of (M3151).

At 0400A the attacks were repulsed and the offensive was resumed. Both the 359th Infantry and 358th

Infantry had heavy fighting throughout the day in a coordinated attack on Mainz. By dark they held the

high ground immediately around the town and were fighting their way nearer. At 1100A the division

CP opened at Nieder Saulheim. The 5th Infantry Division spent a quiet day. In the 11th Infantry the 1st

Battalion moved to Offenheim and the 3rd Battalion to Nierstein. The division CP moved to

Wendesheim. The 11th Armored Division continued to clear to the Rhine River in its zone, mopping up

scattered strong points. Early in the day CCB attacked the airfield southwest of Worms and by 0910A

had taken it against light opposition. Other elements of CCB worked towards the Rhine River between

Worms and Petersau and at 1045A were 1 km from the river. After clearing the airfield, CCB moved

into Worms and relieved the elements of the 4th Armored Division remaining there. CCA remained in

its position. At 1555A CCR had cleared Reudolfskirchen and Ratskirchen. During the day CCR cleared

22 towns west of the Glan River, taking 2,210 PWs. By night the division had cleared to the Rhine in its

zone and had contact with a 4th Armored Division on its left and the 12th Armored Division of XX

Corps on the right. Little activity took place in the 89th Infantry Division zone. The pocket southwest

of Sobernheim was cleared. The dispositions at the close of the day were: 553rd Infantry, 1st Battalion

at Kirschoth, 3rd Battalion at Meddersheim; the 354th Infantry at Jechenbach, Hoppstadten, and

Schweinscheid. During the day the VIII-XII Corps boundary was changed to give Bingen to XII Corps

and Simmern and Treis to VIII Corps.

c. Enemy artillery activity was light over the Corps front. Only five counterbattery missions

were fired.

d. Operational Directive No 92 was issued. The 5th Infantry Division was directed to move all

elements into new zone, relieve elements of the 90th Infantry Division and 4th Armored Division in

zone without delay, and be prepared to cross the Rhine. The 90th Infantry Division, with the 2nd

Cavalry Group attached, was directed to simulate a crossing northwest of Mainz on Corps order, protect

the left flank, and maintain contact with VIII Corps. The 4th Armored Division, after clearing the area

assigned in Operation Directive No 91, was to hold the West Bank of the Rhine until relieved by the 5th

Infantry Division and XX Corps, at which time it would assemble in Corps reserve. The 11th Armored

Division was to clear its area, hold the West Bank of the Rhine, and, upon relief by XX Corps, assemble

in Corps reserve. The 89th Infantry Division was directed to assemble, prepare either to relieve the 4th

Armored Division West of Gernsheim to cross the Rhine River, or to follow the 5th Infantry Division

across. The TDs, chemical units, and field artillery units were regrouped. …

"The Corps now controlled the West Bank of the Rhine River from Bingen to Worms. …"

Conditions along the roads of the Palantinate as the helter-skelter race for the Rhine went on are

suggested by two press releases preserved in Lt Henry Murray's PRO file, and one interview with an

artilleryman secured by the corps history team after the war. The first press release is the final word on

a condition of "fluid" warfare:

"WITH THE XII CORPS IN GERMANY – during the dash to the Rhine XII Corps Artillery

Wire Officer Capt Roland Jensen of Portland, Oregon, jeeped up to contact front-line units.

"After passing several spots still warm from enemy actions, Capt Jensen dismounted to proceed

on foot. Turning off the road, he saw a bare headed, barefooted soldier in a pond, fishing nonchalantly.

"'Hey!' Yelled the Captain, don't you know there's enemy around here?'

"'No, it's safe enough; we're way behind the Kraut lines.' …

The interview cited was with Sgt Nicholas Vergadamo, of the 731st Field Artillery Battalion:

On 20 March 45, Able Battery was with the forward elements of the combat command of the 4th

Armored Division. We had a couple of men from fire direction center working with the battery to

compute firing data. the remainder of the Battalion was waiting behind in Volxheim. We went into

Heimersheim, preceded by a company of armored infantry. The armored elements stayed in the main

road and went right through the town without stopping. We were the first American troops to stop in the

town, a community of 1500 or 2000 inhabitants. We didn't see many people walking in the streets few

white flags. The BC (Battery Commander),Capt Connor, went after the burgomeister, and told him he

would give him half an hour to get all the firearms turned in. Within about 15 minutes they were all in.

The Town Crier, some big guy, gave the call. The town bell was wrong to alert people. The people

were told not to congregate in the streets and they didn't. They were told to tear down the road blocks at

the entrances to town. … in this position we picked up a 15-year-old Wehrmacht member, of the 15th

Panzer Division. He was scared and crying, and stayed with us that night. This boy told us, as most

enemy soldiers, that they didn't fear our infantry, but they will they were terribly afraid of our artillery

and airplanes. We were told by the BC that we faced a long trip – we were going into Pffedersheim to

shoot into Worms as direct support of the fourth Armored. We took off for Pffedersheim about 11

o'clock at night, and arrived there at Don. The move was about 90 miles. Hundreds of prisoners were

clogging roads, waving white handkerchiefs, asking to be picked up. The 4th Armored, nobody, would

take them – and they were told to keep on the main road, and keep walking back until somebody did

take them. Later on we found out that someone came up behind the armored and established cages,

huge fields for the Heinies. …"

The "someone" Sgt Birgadamo referred to was, of course, XX Corps. How this worked, at least

on one occasion in the Palantinate, is revealed in the other press release cited above, which appeared in

the Stars & Stripes, 31 March 45:

"WITH THE XX CORPS IN GERMANY – Lt Col unique J. Scanlan, of Edwardsville, Illinois,

is the XX Corps Provost Marshall. On 20 March Lt Col Scanlan received an urgent call to come and get

5000 Germans who had decided war was not for them. The PWs were 25 miles ahead. Only 12 men

and two trucks were available for the job. It didn't add up, so Lt Col Scanlon gave an order:

"25 miles ahead we have 5000 PWs waiting. Go up and build a cage around them!"

Men in XII Corps, and the rest of the American Army so cruelly disappointed in the previous fall

and winter, began to dare to take hope again that the end of the war was in sight. This certainly looked

like the beginning of the end, anyway. It certainly looked like that "Destruction of the German Armies

in Western Europe" which the High Brass had been saying all along was necessary before the war would

be won and we could all go home. And once again, the voices of those who should know were raised in

the optimistic statements, though perhaps somewhat more cautiously than had been the case during the

previous September, when even the most famous statesmen had been predicting the eminent conclusion

of the Battle of Europe.

Gen Patton in a special order to officers and men of Third Army and XIX TAC, dated 23 March

45, summed up the results of the recent operations:

"In the period from 29 January to 22 March 45, you have wrested 6,484 miles of territory from

the enemy. You have taken 3,072 cities, towns and villages, including among the former: Trier,

Koblenz, Bingen, Worms, Mainz, Kaiserslautern and Ludwigshafen.

"You have captured 140,112 enemy soldiers, and have killed or wounded an additional 99,000,

thereby eliminating practically all of the German 7th and 1st Armies. History records no greater

achievement in so limited time.

"This great campaign was only made possible by your disciplined valor, unswerving devotion to

duty, coupled with the unparalleled audacity and speed of your advance on the ground; while from the

air, the peerless fighter-bombers kept up a relentless round-the-clock attack upon the disorganized

enemy.

"The world rings with your praises; better still, Gen Montgomery, Gen Eisenhower, Gen Bradley

have all personally commended you. The highest honor I have ever attained is that of having my name

coupled with yours in these great events.

"Please accept my heartfelt admiration and thanks for what you have done. …"

And Gen Eisenhower, in the unshakable confidence of hindsight, was to put it with maximum

brevity and impact in his postwar report in the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 13 July 45, when he classed

this campaign as one of the three crucial operations of the war:

"The third decisive phase of the campaign (for Europe) consisted of the battles west of the Rhine

during February and March. Once again the enemy played into our hands by his insistence upon

fighting the battle where he stood. In the lowland country between the Rhine and the Meuse, in the

Eifel, and in the Saar, the armies which had been intended to defend Germany were shattered beyond

recovery. The potential barrier of the Rhine lay practically undefended before us, and from that time

onward there was no German force in existence capable of halting our forward march. The war was

won before the Rhine was crossed."

THE NINETIETH TOOK THE LARGEST CITY IN THE

PALATINATE – MAINZ

(1) After stiff resistance on 21 March, the "Tough 'Ombres" of the 90th Infantry Division cleared Mainz, Germany, on the day that the

pictures on this page were taken, 22 March 45. These are men of a 2nd Battalion, 358th Infantry Regiment reconnoitering the rubble-filled

streets of the city for remaining snipers. (2) Infantry and armor, 1st Battalion 359th Infantry Regiment and 773rd Tank Battalion advance

within the city. (3) More of the 359th at work, in another part of the town. (4) Company B of the 359th, is here represented by Pfc.

William Parker who is firing from a window in Mainz while Captain John R. Angell calls the shots.