III. THE SYSTEM OF SUPPLY

T is in the story of battalions advancing in an unbroken wave under a rolling barrage, or the description of the maneuvers of combat groups to outflank deadly machine gun positions, or the narration of heroic exploits of patrols, that everyone expects to find the dramatic and spectacular incidents of war. But any divisional history which relates nothing more than the actual clashes of Americans and Germans must necessarily be incomplete. A division is more than its infantry, artillery, and numerous auxiliary arms. The trains and other organizations which keep the fighting men supplied with food and water, which replenish the ammunition belt when clips are running short which insure clothing and essential articles of equipment, and which transport the fighting man to the spot where he can fight, are an integral part of the battle machine.

The successive steps in getting food and ammunition forward from the point to which it is brought by railway until it is delivered into the hands of the men in the front line companies form a chain which may be designated as the “system of supply.” Nor is the history of the organizations which constitute the links in that chain lacking in situations as tragic, as noteworthy, as humorous as are to be found in the annals of the war.

The point at which the Division’s interest in this supply system begins is as far back as the “regulating station,” where the daily pack-trains for divisions at the front are made up and routed. These trains, made up of cars of beef, bread, potatoes, hay, and other articles of rations and forage, were despatched daily to a railhead in the area of the division to which they were assigned, and at this rail-head were unloaded the supplies to be stored in the railhead dump.

ON THE ST. MIHIEL FRONT

WHEN the 90th Division first went into the line, the regulating station of the 1stArmy was near Is-sur-Tille, a little town north of Dijon, where vast warehouses and shops had been erected and which had become one of the most important points on the American Expeditionary Forces’ lines of communication, which ran from the base ports through Tours up to the American front in Lorraine. The activities of the various units in the Division which moved the food and supplies forward from the railhead dump to the combatant troops were coordinated by the first section of the General Staff (G-1). The next link in the chain was the heads of the services. Lieutenant-Colonel John G. Winters and, later, Lieutenant-Colonel M. A. Rice secured and distributed the ordnance material; while the division quartermaster, Major Albert Feiss, had direct charge of the procurement and distribution of rations and other quartermaster supplies. Major Hubert W. Browder, assistant quartermaster, served as subsistence officer throughout the Division’s battle period. In spite of the frequent changes in railheads, especially during the Meuse-Argonne offensive, not a day passed without rations being issued by the division quartermaster.

The first railhead of the 90th Division after entering the line was La Cumejie, about two kilometers east of Manoncourt-en-Woevre, and about thirteen kilometers from the front line. On September 9 the railhead was transferred to Belleville, and the office of the division quartermaster was established at Dieulouard, where the companies of the supply train were also located. While the railhead was at La Cumejie, a little French railway of 60-cm. gauge, running forward from Manoncourt, was extensively used to carry the rations forward to regimental dumps. It required twenty-six cars to transport each day’s rations. The cars were loaded in the afternoon and all trips made at night; but as soon as the preparations for the St. Mihiel offensive got under way it was found necessary to use the 60-cm. railway for transporting heavier materials, such as ammunition and engineering equipment. The carrying forward of rations then devolved exclusively upon the 315th Supply Train. Owing to the shortage of horses and wagons in the infantry regiments, it was necessary to truck the rations as far forward as possible in order to shorten the haul for the regimental trains. On the day of the attack the Division had only 50 per cent of its allowance of animals. Before the attack the distribution points at which the supplies were transferred from the trucks to the regimental wagons were St. Jean for troops on the left of the divisional sector, and Jezainville for organizations in the right sub-sector.

The memorable period preceding the attack was one that the drivers of the supply train have particular occasion to remember. The establishment of forward dumps in preparation for the offensive necessitated an unusually heavy traffic over all roads, particularly through the ForLt de Puvenelle, where many of the dumps were located. All hauling was done in the night, without lights, over roads which had been rendered slippery and treacherous by constant rains. In the blackness of the dense woods, with heavy traffic in both directions, many drivers allowed the trucks to get an inch too close to the ditch and were soon

capsized. Each morning there were a certain number still stuck in the mud, which the drivers had been unable to extricate before daybreak. The supply train went into the operation handicapped both in trucks and experienced personnel. On September 12 the Division had of its authorized allowance only 65 per cent of serviceable motor-cars, 55 per cent, of serviceable trucks, and 53 per cent of serviceable motorcycles.

In preparing for the St. Mihiel drive, every precaution was taken to insure the fighting men hot meals as frequently as the tactical situation allowed them to lay aside the rifle and take up the mess kit. The field trains, loaded with two days’ field rations and one day’s reserve rations, and the rolling kitchens, carrying one day’s field rations, were as near the front line as conditions would warrant when the infantry jumped off, and followed up the advancing battalions as soon as roads could be built across No Man’s Land. Of course, during the first twenty-four hours after the attack was launched at 5 A. M., September 12,the soldiers ate the lunch they carried, and drew on two days’ “iron” rations of hardtack and bacon. In the afternoon of the second day hot food had been got up to the troops of the 357th Infantry, and by that night a roadway had been constructed north from Fey-en-Haye, so that the kitchens of the 358th Infantry were established, on the morning of September 14, at the south edge of Bois de Friere, which had been captured by the 2d Battalion on the previous day. Thanks to better roads in the 180th Brigade sector and the shorter advance on September12, the problem of supplying the men of the 359th and 360th Infantry was not so difficult at the beginning.

On September 13 and 14 the distributing point for the 360th Infantry was at Jezainville, and for all other organizations was along the Montauville-Auberge St. Pierre road. On September 15 the supplies were trucked forward to Norroy for the 360th Infantry, to a point near Fey-en-Haye for the 358th and 359th Infantry, and to a point on the road leading northwest of Fey-en-Haye for the 357th Infantry, and were distributed at these points about 5 P. M. daily. The regimental supply companies had moved forward behind the infantry, and, despite the casualties among both the men and the horses, kept the advancing troops abundantly provided with food. But the shortage of horses became so serious that it was decided to withdraw the regimental supply companies to positions back of the Metz highway. Accordingly, the 358th Infantry Supply Company was established in the woods east of Auberge St. Pierre, and the supply companies of the359th and 360th Infantry were billeted at Montauville. However, exception was made of the 357th Infantry, owing to the length of haul that such an arrangement would have made necessary. The supplying of this regiment was particularly difficult in that it was necessary for the trucks of the supply train to make a long detour in order to reach a point near Viéville-en-Haye, where the supply company received the supplies. The route followed was west from Fey-en-Haye through Regniéville into the 78th Division sector, and then into Viéville.

The ammunition supply was under the immediate direction of Captain Walter Negley, division munitions officer. Before the attack small-arms ammunition, grenades, and pyrotechnics were hauled from the 1st Corps dump to the division dump in the corner of ForLt de Puvenelle, two kilometers east of Mamey. and four regimental dumps were established further forward. This dump was not moved during the Division’s period of occupancy of the sector, although the artillery ammunition dump for both division and corps was moved forward to a point near Auberge St. Pierre soon after the advance. Before the attack, Company A of the supply train, equipped with light delivery trucks, and the small-arms horse section of the ammunition train were parked in the Puvenelle Woods near the small-arms ammunition dump. The light delivery trucks proved to be particularly valuable, as necessary ammunition or pyrotechnics could be rushed to any point on short notice by this means. The shortage of animals reduced the regimental combat trains to less than 50 per cent of their normal allowance. Owing to the shortage of both horses and combat wagons, the horse section of the ammunition train and the company of light delivery trucks practically took the place of the combat trains. The Division had only 50 per cent of its allowance of combat wagons on September 12. Despite the good work of these units, the difficulty of crossing the maze of wire and trenches made it necessary for the infantry to carry ammunition long distances.

Immediately preceding the attack an extra supply of ammunition was delivered to the front line units, so that every man went over the top with 220 rounds S. A. A. and two O. F. grenades. It was also necessary to supply ammunition for pistols, rifles, grenades, machine guns, Stokes mortars, and one-pounders; flares with which to signal to aëroplanes: and the innumerable rockets and fireworks prescribed in the plan of liaison. After the advance got under way the narrow-gauge railway was used to its maximum capacity in advancing the artillery ammunition and engineering dumps farther in the rear to a new location near Auberge St. Pierre. The 315th Supply Train answered emergency calls in hauling artillery ammunition, and a varying number of supply trucks were used daily to supplement the trucks of the 303d Ammunition Train. Companies A and C of the 315th Ammunition Train, which had been attached to the 1st Corps Artillery Park, furnished trucks to transport ammunition in the 90th Division sector.

Inseparable from the system of supply is the question of traffic control, for all circulation would be soon stopped by jams if motor vehicles were allowed to proceed as they pleased. Hence it was necessary to prescribe definite circuits and to enforce them by means of military police. Prior to the attack, army orders prohibiting circulation by day were very strict with a view to concealing the operations. No circulation was allowed except on passes, which were inspected at almost ever cross-road. Just prior to the attack all motor traffic except motor-cycle side-cars was prohibited in front of the line Dieulouard-Griscourt-Martin-Court.

The 90th Division axial road during the St. Mihiel operations was from Dieuiouard along the river to Pont-a-Mousson, thence west to a point just beyond Auberge St. Pierre, where the road turns north to Fey-en-Haye, proceeding north-ward to Vilcey-sur-Trey and St. Marie Farm. The return circuit ran southward from Auberge St. Pierre through the Forét de Puvenelle. No spot in the divisional area presented a scene of greater activity during the advance than the Auberge St. Pierre cross-roads. Of necessity, all traffic toward the front passed through this point. Owing to its accessibility, dumps of food and of engineering and ammunition supplies were located near by, making it the rendezvous of all motor and horse trains. This was the focus which also drew infantrymen going to and returning from the front lines. Such a center of activity was naturally quickly spotted by hostile aircraft, and the crossroads were constantly shelled. If this shelling did not diminish the traffic, it at least had a stimulating effect in keeping convoys and single vehicles on the move. This was aptly illustrated on the afternoon of September 13, when the movement of the79th Division, in reserve, across the front of the 90th Division caused a traffic jam that extended for miles in every direction. The most strenuous efforts of military policemen were unavailing: but when the shells began to drop, trucks which had been stuck in the mud were extricated in an almost miraculous manner.

Setting itself up for business in the ruins of the old inn, the Red Cross seized a wonderful opportunity for service when service was needed. Harry C. Blackwell served more than 4000 cups of chocolate daily at this point, and supplies of chocolate bars, cigarettes, and tobacco were distributed to organizations. During the drive 3000 newspapers were received daily from Paris and were distributed at the canteens and sent forward by ambulances and supply wagons. Both Mr. Blackwell, the divisional representative of the Red Cross, and Mr. J. W. Nixon, the divisional Y. M. C. A. secretary, had headquarters at Griscourt, and from this point sent forward supplies to the advancing troops. The majority of the wounded of the Division came back through the dressing stations at Fey-en-Haye and Montauville, and hot chocolate, cookies, and cigarettes were distributed at these dressing stations and field hospitals by the Red Cross and the Y. M. C. A.

In addition to controlling traffic by means of stationary posts of dismounted police, and by patrols of mounted police, the 90th Division Military Police Company, commanded by Captain Albert Boggess, was in charge of evacuating prisoners from Division Headquarters to Griscourt, of guarding them while being examined, and of forwarding them to the corps prisoner of war enclosure.

The difficulty of obtaining animals made the evacuation and care of wounded horses a matter of importance. From September 11 to 17, thirty-six animals were killed and two hundred and sixty-six were evacuated owing to wounds and other causes. A detail from the 315th Mobile Veterinary Hospital was stationed in the Puvenelle Woods to collect wounded horses and send them back to corps advance collecting station near Gezoncourt. Food and ammunition were of greatest importance, but by no means the only articles which it was necessary for the division quartermaster to supply. Many of the men’s uniforms were in rags, and underclothing had become ridden with“cooties.” Beginning immediately after the conclusion of the offensive operations, practically the entire enlisted personnel of the Division was passed through the baths at Griscourt before the Division left the St. Mihiel sector. At the baths every man discarded his old underwear and received a new suit. In addition, eighty per cent of the men were given new breeches, and about half of them got new blouses and shoes. Before the attack the men’s shelter-half, blankets, over-coats, extra underwear, and shoes had been tied in bundles, marked with the soldiers’ names, and collected into battalion dumps. When the situation became stabilized, these packs were hauled forward and distributed to the men.

Before the attack it was the plan to extend the 60-cm. railway which ran from Belleville to Griscourt past the engineering and ammunition dumps in the Forét de Puvenelle and Auberge St. Pierre, so as to connect with the German light railway through the Stumpflager; but, owing to the shortage of ballast, the work was not completed and the connection was not made before the Division was relieved. The light railway from Manoncourt to St. Jean, Regniéville, and Viéville was used by the division on our left flank.

The enemy discovered the ration distributing point at Dieulouard soon after it was established there and shelled the town continuously with long-range guns. The first shells arrived at 1 A. M. September 4 and caused six casualties. With the exception of one day, the town was shelled daily thereafter until the Division left the sector. The distributing point was changed to adjacent villages from time to time to escape this fire.

DURING THE MEUSE-ARGONNE OPERATIONS

ON being relieved by the 7th Division, the division railhead changed to Toul on October 11. On the heels of the relief came orders for the move to the Blercourt area. The arrangement of the details for the bussing of the personnel by the French C. R. A., the convoys of motor and horse transport. and the provisions for transporting kitchens, baggage, and headquarters material, were matters primarily of G-1 concern, and were managed with remarkable success, despite the uncertainty which surrounded the entire movement.

The officers and men of both motor and horse transport units, in spite of the fact that they were already fatigued by working overtime during the relief, carried through their part of the program. All large-bodied trucks were used to transport rolling kitchens, and the others were filled with rations, ammunition, and baggage. The first convoy left the Lucey area on September 13, at the same time as the departure of the personnel of the 179th Brigade in the French busses, but followed a different route. Lieutenant (later Captain) Lloyd A. Skiles, in command, led his column along the road through Cornieville, Apremont, and the historic town of St. Mihiel; then up the east bank of the Meuse to Dieue-sur-Meuse. Where the river was crossed: thence through Ancemont to Lemmes, where the column turned into the Bar-le-Duc-Verdun road. Before the convoy reached Lemmes, Lieutenant Skiles went ahead to Blercourt to the division P. C. to get orders for further routing, as the allotment of the billeting area was being made simultaneously with the movement of troops. Receiving orders to go to Blercourt, he returned to Lemmes and found that the French officers of the C. R. A.,thinking that his trucks had become separated from the regular convoys, had placed them in the French columns. Lieutenant Skiles had some difficulty in explaining the situation, extricating his men, and reforming the convoy, but Blercourt was reached in due time.

The changes in orders made the task of Lieutenant (later Captain) A. J. Moquin, division billeting officer, particularly difficult. An advance billeting party, composed of brigade, regimental, and battalion billeting officers, in charge of Lieutenant Moquin, left Lucey the night of October 12 in motorcycle side-cars and trucks for the new area, with orders to report to the zone major at Baleycourt, about five kilometers west of Verdun. Upon arousing the Frenchman from his slumbers early in the morning, they were politely informed that he had nothing whatsoever to do with the billeting area which had been assigned to the 90th Division. But the proper parties were soon located, and the billeting officers started to work to make the necessary subdivisions. Nixeville was decided upon as division headquarters, but about noon word was received that the army had designated Blercourt as the P. C . At that time Blercourt was filled by the 80th Division, which had just come out of the line; but as that division was going back into reserve, Blercourt was vacated in our favor. Nixeville was then given to the 179th Brigade, but the town was practically filled by the rear echelon of the 5th Division.

The billeting officers worked like Trojans, despite the discouragement they received whenever a change in orders rendered all previous efforts futile. After all arrangements had been made in accordance with one order, the 179th Brigade was finally ordered to an entirely different area in the Bois de Sivry, and the entire job had to be done over again. Similarly, in the case of the 180th Brigade, after the Bois de Nixeville had been apportioned even down to companies and platoons, and provisions made for road maps and guides, an eleventh-hour change put this wood in the sector of the 17th French Corps. Undaunted, the billeting officers jumped on their motorcycles and soon had the Jouy-Rampont area allotted.

The second convoy moved with the 180th Brigade, under Major Ewing of the supply train. On leaving Ancemont, the road was lost and the trucks were stuck in the mud all one night, but they were extricated and proceeded to Vadelaincourt, to which town the railhead had moved on October 14. The regimental supply companies and other horse transport moved by another route under command of Lieutenant-Colonel C. W. Tillotson, 360th infantry. The trip was made in four stages, halts being made for one night at each of the following towns: Mecrin, Pierrefitte, and St. André.

Practically all personnel and some baggage were moved by French busses and trucks. More than one comical situation arose as a result of confusion of languages. Part of the surplus personnel of the supply train and of division headquarters was transported in French trucks. At the time of this move the air was thick with rumors as to a general retreat on the part of the Germans and offers of peace to the Allied Powers. On arriving at Souilly, headquarters of the 1st Army, which was a regulating station for the C. R. A., the drivers of the trucks picked up a rumor that peace had finally come. With a wild rush and cries of “La guerre est fini!” the drivers deserted the trucks where they stood in the road and made for the nearest buvette where “pinard” could he found.

The most vivid impression of the Meuse-Argonne sector which lingers in the memory of the officers and men charged with the functioning of the system of supply is the length of hauls from railhead to distributing point, and the poor state of the roads over which the hauls were made. Throughout most of this period the distance from railhead to distributing point was a minimum of thirty kilometers, and, owing to the condition of the roads and the large amount of traffic on them, almost twenty-four hours were required for the round trip. The result was that the drivers of the supply train were almost constantly at the wheel, day and night, remaining on the job until so dulled by fatigue that it was dangerous to allow them to drive.

There were other handicaps under which the men labored, such as the frequent changes in railheads, but the net result was always the same, namely, increase in the length of haul. Four changes in railheads were experienced in as many days. From October 24 to November 4 the railhead was at Baleycourt, but it changed on November 5 to Cierges. The ration train, however, did not arrive at Cierges, and on November 6 rations were drawn at Varennes. On November 7 rations were drawn at Verdun, where the railhead remained until the armistice. Owing to the length of the trips, it was not always possible to get word of the change to the officers of the supply train, with the result that the trucks made the trip all the way to Baleycourt, to no avail. The supply train was billeted in quarries near Sivry-la-Perche from October 25 to November 5, moving on the latter date to Cierges; but practically every moment of the men’s time was spent on their trucks.

Words cannot depict the miserable condition of the roads, which had been hastily constructed over lands rendered desolate by four years of war and daily pocked with fresh shell-holes made by the never-ceasing fire of German batteries. As these roads could accommodate only one-way traffic, all traffic necessarily followed a long circuit, making the distance to be traveled by ration convoys at times approximately one hundred kilometers.

Enough laborers to make a fair-sized army were employed in repairing the lines of communication, and the 315th Engineers were early set to this task. On October 17 the regiment began work under corps orders. On October 22 the 1st Battalion reverted to division command, but continued on road work as far north as Bantheville. When the 2d Battalion was released to the Division on October29, it moved to Madeleine Farm and assisted men of the 1st Battalion in constructing the division P. C. at Romagne.

On relieving the 5th Division in the line, this Division had taken over its food dumps – minus the food – on the outskirts of Nantillois and its ammunition dump between Nantillois and Septsarges. A ration distributing point was established at Nantillois on October 21. The enemy discovered the unusual activity of the trucks at that point, and proceeded to let the fact be known by turning loose a few “whizbangs” of Austrian 88’s. Four well-placed shells within fifty feet of the dump claimed twelve casualties.

In preparation for the renewal of the offensive on November 1, an advance ration dump was established at the road junction one kilometer northwest of Nantillois. The trucks with rations and supplies arrived on October 29, and the dump was made ready for issue on October 30. Enemy airplanes discovered this activity, and placed one shell directly in the dump. Despite the fact that precautionary measures had been taken, and only a few ration carts were allowed to be at the dump at any given time, the enemy batteries concentrated on this spot and dropped about 300 shells in that vicinity during the day of the 30th. Nine casualties were suffered in the supply train personnel delivering the rations and the quartermaster details operating the dump, and some supplies were destroyed. On the night of October 30 the remaining supplies were moved back to the former dump on the other side of Nantillois. Although this dump was bombed, the aerial torpedoes missed their mark.

As the infantry advanced, the distributing point was pushed forward accordingly. It was moved to the southwestern outskirts of Cunel on November 3, and the next day to Villers-devant-Dun. Quartermaster stores, gas-mask supplies, and ordnance material were also on hand at these dumps.

The supplying of ammunition presented difficulties equally as great as the getting up of rations. The divisional dump was moved from Nantillois to a point just northwest of Cunel, on the axial road, prior to the attack of November 1. The light delivery trucks which had been assigned on the ratio of twelve to each regiment proved to be the ideal sort of transportation for carrying forward to the combat trains the small-arms ammunition, grenades, pyrotechnics, and other munitions required by infantry organizations.

A provisional ammunition train was organized on October 17: one company composed of ammunition bodied trucks, under command of Captain F. A. Folmer, former division M. T. O., transported ammunition from the corps dump to the division dump, and moved the division dump forward after the advance got underway; the other company, composed of light delivery trucks, commanded by Lieutenant R. F. Lehman, functioned as in the St. Mihiel operations.

The artillery ammunition supply was very precarious. A comparative shortage of ammunition at this time affected all combat divisions of the French and American armies, and forced the strictest economy. As the 155th Field Artillery Brigade, supporting the 90th Division, calculated its daily expenditures with the greatest care, and the trucks of its ammunition train (the 303d) worked twenty-four hours a day, there was never a serious shortage as far as this Division was concerned. During the period of waiting on the west bank of the Meuse before the crossing on November 9, the need for artillery support was not very great, and the batteries were able to accumulate a supply adequate for any eventualities. While the artillery was in readiness at all times to support the crossing of the Meuse by the 5th Division, it was called on only for a few missions of minor importance.

The condition of the roads, and the shortage of horses and trucks, hampered the delivery of artillery ammunition, just the same as with the infantry. The road circuit required them to pass through Buzancy, far to the west, with the result that the round trip could seldom be completed in less than twenty-four hours.

The division axial road was as follows: Montzeville-Esnes-Malancourt-Montfaucon-Nantillois- Cunel-Bantheville. As the stone arch across the Andon brook at Bantheville had been destroyed by the enemy in his retreat, it was necessary to restore this bridge in order to open up communications beyond that point. The engineer train was moved to Cunel on October 30, and on the next night Company A, 315th Engineers, rebuilt the destroyed bridge, notwithstanding exceptionally heavy Boche firing. At the same time Company B constructed a ford over the brook about two hundred yards below the bridge, but it was not necessary to use it.

Owing to the rapidity of the advance after the break through on November 1, practically all engineering troops were kept on the roads. The original plan of communication provided that the axial road for the 3d Corps and also for the 90th Division would continue from Bantheville north to Andevanne and thence to Villers-devant-Dun, but the amount of work required to make the Bantheville-Andevanne-Villers road suitable for heavy trucks was so great that this plan was abandoned and the road to Villers by way of Aincreville was used instead.

Numerous shell-holes existed on the narrow road from Aincreville to VilIers. Trucks of the supply train succeeded in making the trip with rations to establish the new dump just south of Villers; but, on attempting to return, so many trucks became “stuck” that a slight jam resulted. As a result of this experience, the road was designated as open to north-bound traffic only, the return trip to Bantheville being made by way of Andevanne.

The supply companies of the regiments did excellent work during the Meuse-Argonne offensive. Before the attack of November 1 the regimental trains were assembled in the area between Cunel and Nantillois, where they remained until orders were given on November 3 to move forward to the wooded valley slightly northeast of Villers-devant-Dun, on the Villers-Montigny road. The rolling kitchens, however, followed the troops very closely throughout the actions, despite the extremely rapid advance. About noon of November 3 the kitchens of the 357th Infantry went rolling into Montigny almost simultaneously with the infantry. This was a matter of considerable importance as regards both the health and the morale of the fighting men.

Although the ration distributing point had moved forward to Villers-devant-Dun on November 4, the office of the quartermaster and the headquarters of the 315th Supply Train remained at Cierges from November 5 to November 10,when both moved to Brieulles, which was the rail head on November 12 and 13.

On the issuance of the field order to cross the Meuse and take up the pursuit, G-1gave instructions to regimental transport to assemble by brigades. The trains of the 179th Brigade were consolidated near Mont-devant-Sassey under Captain A. W. Guthrie, 357th Infantry, and the 180th Brigade transport also came together near Mont-devant-Sassey, under Captain J. W. Lynch, 360th Infantry. The water-carts, rolling kitchens, and a portion of the combat trains accompanied the infantry across the river. The remaining portions of these trains were held by G-1 at their points of rendezvous until traffic conditions and the tactical situation rendered it advisable to send them across the river.

On November 11 Sassey was designated as the ration distributing point, and on November 12 the supply train moved to that town. The railhead moved to Dun-sur-Meuse on November 14.

ATTACHED UNITS

ATTACHED to the 90th Division during the period of its activity in France were a number of organizations which, in most cases, were not provided for in the tables of organization, but which, nevertheless, had been created during the war to fill particular needs. Such, for example, was Salvage Unit No. 310, commanded by Lieutenant H. L. Leighton, and composed of thirty enlisted men. This small crew was able to collect and ship back to depots for reclamation articles of an estimated value of more than a million dollars. Not only was this a profitable business, but it also rendered valuable service in that it decreased the amount of imports required at a time when tonnage was at a premium.

The list of articles salvaged ranged from tanks and trucks to tin cans and tent-pins. There were 2,037,500 rounds of ammunition saved. Despite the best efforts of the salvage squads, it is safe to assume that rifle-clips are still scattered from St. Nazaire to Coblenz. One of the largest items was both German and American ordnance property, such as machine gun carts, caissons, rifles, and even trench knives. The list also included quartermaster property of all descriptions, and medical, engineer, and signal material.

Naturally a small squad of thirty men was not able to go out into the field and assemble all these articles. Details from the infantry regiments, aggregating at times as many as four hundred men, under the direction of Major L. F. Harrod, thoroughly scoured the divisional area, assembling this salvage at the ration distributing points and along the roads used by motor trucks. These returning motor trucks, after delivering rations, would pick up this salvage and transport it to the divisional railhead, where the salvage squad was located. It was there checked over and classified, and the serviceable articles were turned over to the division quartermaster or ordnance officer, the remainder being shipped to salvage depots in the rear.

The 315th Mobile Ordnance Repair Shop performed what was in some ways a similar function. The unit did not complete its training at Camp Williams until September 22. It arrived at Saizerais on September 24, under the command of Captain Alfred W. Baldwin, Ordnance Corps. All salvage gathered from the divisional area was delivered to the repair shop’s forward dump, from which it was sent to the shop. In emergencies the ordnance repair shop was able to supply the division ordnance officer with considerable quantities of small arms. Supply officers took all unserviceable arms to the shop, and received serviceable arms in their stead. Upon telephone notice from artillery headquarters, a detail of officers and men was sent with tools to the battery positions to make repairs. In the Meuse-Argonne sector, the repair shop was stationed first at Vigneville and later at Bantheville, at the latter place taking over the repair work of the155th Field Artillery Brigade.

Motor Shop Truck Units Nos. 391 and 398 operating under the division motor transport officer, repaired all division motor transport. The M. T. O. was charged with the responsibility of keeping necessary records of motor vehicles and with their upkeep and repair.

Later on, many other units were attached to the Division such as a bakery company, a clothing and bathing unit, and a laundry establishment.

WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS

ALSO attached to the 90th Division were militarized representatives of three societies the Y. M. C. A.. the Red Cross, and the Knights of Columbus. While each of these organizations was charged exclusively with a special field of activity, their principal achievements were along the same lines of welfare work.

The Y. M. C. A. was first to join the Division. On July 10, Mr. J. W. Nixon, divisional secretary, and Mr. L. B. Young, business secretary, joined. During that month Miss Anna Cooper, our first woman worker, arrived, being soon followed by Mrs. Mabel Deering. These two women were with the Division throughout its battle career, and remained with it during the time it was a part of the Army of Occupation. Mr. Nixon was in charge of the Y. M. C. A. work in the Division during the St. Mihiel operations, being succeeded on October 4 by Mr. P. H. McDowell, who directed these activities during the Meuse-Argonne offensive and the march to Germany. On February 28, 1919, Mr. Young became divisional secretary. Mr. Young and Mr. A. G. Moseley were also with the Division continuously. The total Y. M. C. A. personnel on September 12 was about twenty. The maximum number at any one time was forty-five – on April 1, 1919 – more than half of whom were women. The principal work of the Y. M. C. A. in the Aignay-le-Duc area was the establishment of canteens, religious activities, and a limited amount of entertainment and lectures. During the offensives, hot chocolate was served free to the soldiers. A large portion of the personnel was engaged in the direction of canteens and reading and writing rooms.

Captain Harry C. Blackwell was divisional representative of the Red Cross until October 1, 1918, when Captain H. P. Fish was appointed. Typical activities of the Red Cross at Auberge St. Pierre have already been described. In addition, the Red Cross distributed free many magazines and newspapers, confections and tobacco, and sweaters and other knitted goods.

The Knights of Columbus maintained a considerable number of reading and writing rooms, and gave away large quantities of candy, cigarettes, and athletic supplies, but generally did not devote as much attention as other welfare organizations to canteen work.

Also associated in the welfare work were the chaplains. In fact, the position of chaplain called for a great versatility of talent, as their activities included religious work, athletics, entertainment and welfare, caring for sick and wounded, and burials.

There were thirteen chaplains with the Division when it arrived in France. On August 27, Clarence H. Reese, who had been the first chaplain to report at Camp Travis and was originally assigned to the 360th Infantry, was made division chaplain. Chaplain Reese had been rector of Trinity Episcopal Church, Victoria, Texas. He came to Texas in 1914 from Washington, where for two years he was assistant rector of St. Thomas Church.

The first day of the St. Mihiel attack the chaplains followed close behind the attacking lines and helped to take care of the wounded. The rain greatly increased the sufferings of the wounded, and the chaplains gathered raincoats from the dead to shelter them, pulled helpless men out of puddles up to higher ground, and assisted others to get into dugouts or under the side of embankments. On the second day of the offensive a burial detail of 118 men was obtained and interments commenced.